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Abstract
In a recent paper, Oliver Will (2009) contends that the effect of mobility on trust that we originally
reported (Macy and Sato 2002) depends on 'an assumption that is most probably an unwilling,
unintended, and unwanted implication of the code.' When we experimented with Will's revised model,
we came to the opposite conclusion: his version provides stronger support for our theory than does
our original. The explanation is that Will left the learning rate at the upper limit of 1.0, the level we
assumed in our original paper. When we lowered the learning rate to compensate for the removal of
the contested assumption, the results showed how mobility can lead to an increase in trust, which is
consistent with our explanation for higher trust in the US compared to Japan. Moreover, the model
also shows that it is possible for there to be too much mobility.
Trust, Mobility, Replication
1.1
We appreciate the considerable effort that Will (2009) has invested in replicating our model for a
second time. As much or more can often be learned from the replications as from the original results,
as can be seen in the series of papers based on Schelling's model of neighborhood segregation and
Axelrod's model of the evolution of cooperation. Will's study offers the opportunity for us to revisit our
2002 model and deepen our understanding of the causal mechanisms through which mobility affects
the levels of trust and cooperation in social and economic exchanges.
1.2
Our original paper (Macy and Sato 2002) addressed an empirical puzzle discovered by Toshio
Yamagishi: Why is trust higher in the individualist US than in collectivist Japan? Yamagishi
(2001;Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994) hypothesizes that Americans developed the "social intelligence"
needed to take advantage of the greater opportunities in a global market—the willingness and ability to
judge who can and cannot be trusted. We wondered why Japanese do not also acquire this same
ability and we used an agent-based stochastic learning model to explore a possible explanation: the
higher rate of social and geographic mobility in the U.S. In our extension of Yamagishi's theory, the
local neighborhood is the "school" in which the skills for trusting strangers are acquired, but only if
there is sufficient mobility that agents occasionally encounter an outsider. However, this explanation
turns out to require a caveat: We found that too much mobility can also undermine trust.
1.3
Will contends that the effect of mobility on trust that we originally reported depends on "an assumption
that is most probably an unwilling, unintended, and unwanted implication of the code." That contestedassumption is that newcomers do not update their propensity to enter the market until they remain in
their new neighborhood for at least one complete iteration. The alternative that Will proposes is to
allow newcomers to update their propensity immediately, as soon as they learn the outcome of the
current iteration. Although he did not initially expect this "seemingly small issue" to have "any
substantial effect on the results of the model," he reports results showing that mobility has no effect on
trust in strangers when the assumption is removed.
1.4
When we experimented with Will's (2009) revised model, we came to the opposite conclusion: his
version of the model provides stronger support for our theory than does our original (Macy and Sato
2002) model. His version is also simpler and more elegant. Thus, were we to publish our 2002 paper
today, we would use his version of the model rather than our original. The revised model shows how
mobility can lead to an increase in trust, which is consistent with our explanation for higher trust in the
US compared to Japan. Moreover, the model also shows that it is possible for there to be too much
mobility.
1.5
Will did not observe these effects because he left the learning rate at the upper limit of 1.0, the level we
assumed in our original paper. When we lowered the learning rate to compensate for the removal of
the one-iteration delay in updating newcomer's propensities to enter the market, the non-monotonic
effects of mobility were again apparent. Figure 1 illustrates the effects of mobility on trust when we
reduced the learning rate to the midpoint, at 0.5. This means that a given outcome has half the effect
on the associated propensity. Other parameters are identical to those in our 2002 paper and in Will's
replication (1000 agents, 2000 iterations, and neighborhoods that vary in size from 10 to 100 by 10;
we also increased the number of realizations from 20 to 100 to improve the statistical reliability of the
results). Figure 1 shows the level of trust in strangers nearly doubles as mobility increases from 0 to
0.2. However, above 0.2, the effect of mobility reverses. This reversal occurs at a mobility rate that is
much more empirically plausible than the reversal at 0.9 in our original results, given that observed
mobility rates are below 0.3 among all the OECD countries, including the US and Japan. Indeed, at
low levels of mobility, the results of our 2002 model were the opposite, with trust initially declining
slightly, and then increasing above 0.1. In short, the results using Will's revised model fit more closely
with the hypothesized effects of mobility than do those we originally reported.
Figure 1. The effect of mobility on trust in strangers with a reduced learning rate (0.5). 1000
agents in 10 to 100 neighborhoods by 10, 2000 iterations per trial, and 100 trials in each
condition.1.6
The sensitivity of the results to the learning rate is instructive. The learning rate determines the
number of steps in a random walk into a cooperative equilibrium.[1] The fewer the steps, the lower the
coordination complexity for reaching this equilibrium. A high learning rate allows agents to coordinate
on a strategy of high trust and high trustworthiness before they learn an effective rule for trusting
strangers, or in Yamagishi's terms, before they acquire the "social intelligence" needed to sustain an
effective global market. As a consequence, agents end up abandoning the market for the higher
payoffs they can earn in local exchange. This effect of the learning rate supports Yamagishi's theory of
trust. Yamagishi argues that populations tend toward either a parochial equilibrium that minimizes the
transaction costs of being cheated, or toward a global-market equilibrium that minimizes the
opportunity costs of a small pool of possible exchange partners. The outcome depends decisively on
whether agents acquire the "social intelligence" needed to effectively navigate a global market. The
argument has the counter-intuitive implication that trust in strangers will be lower in collectivist
societies like Japan. Yamagishi's empirical findings are consistent with this hypothesis, but because
the argument is highly counter-intuitive, many scholars have remained skeptical. Demonstrating this
dynamic with a formal model is therefore important in showing that the theory is logical even though it
violates intuition.
1.7
To sum up, Will correctly identified an unnecessary assumption in our model that, when removed,
strengthens our original result, both theoretically and empirically. His careful examination of our study
has contributed not only to better understanding of the effects of mobility on trust but also to the
appreciation of the methodological value of model replication. We believe both of his comments on our
paper are valuable contributions, on both substantive and methodological grounds, and we look
forward to the next one.[2]
 Notes
1 The dynamics of random walk are explained in Macy and Flache (2002).
2 "The model's high sensitivity to small modifications of the learning algorithm will be addressed in
future work" (fn 12).
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